Russia is losing its grip on the Caucuses
Is the Zangezur Corridor is a deal that sidelines Russia and it’s regional power.
At the end of June 2025, an escalating tit-for-tat broke out between Azerbaijan and Russia - and while hostilities have been brewing, not a lot has been known about the significance of a transport link called the Zangezur Corridor, which might be at the heart of the breakdown or relations and current power struggle between the two nations states.
01 July, 2025:
There are unconfirmed reports that “Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan have reached an agreement on the Zangezur corridor during Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s recent visit to Turkey. Under this deal, Russia will have zero control over the corridor effectively being cut out entirely.
In response, Moscow attempted a failed coup against Pashinyan through clerical channels last week to disrupt the ongoing negotiations. Now, it’s trying to pressure Azerbaijan, but those efforts are also falling flat. In essence, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are forming a new regional axis that openly challenges Russian influence.”
If this report is true, it represents a significant step in reducing Russia’s reach over Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia and other regional countries. To understand a bit more of the corridor, it’s significance and the geopolitical tensions that have existed, here is a potted guide with references.
Armenia and Azerbaijan:
The overall situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan has undergone substantial changes in recent years. Both are engaged in peace negotiations that involve numerous difficult decisions on both sides – from border demarcation to the future of regional infrastructure projects such as the Zangezur Corridor.
In 2024, Nagorno-Karabakh (unrecognised Armenian enclave on Azerbaijani territory) underwent significant geopolitical shifts following the 2020 war and the exodus of the Armenian population from this territory. In September 2023, after a brief military operation by Azerbaijan, the de facto separatist authorities in Stepanakert capitulated.
In the days that followed, over 100,000 Armenians—virtually the entire population—fled to Armenia, citing security concerns, fears of ethnic persecution, and the absence of guarantees for their rights and identity under reinstated Azerbaijani control. On January 1, 2024, the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh officially dissolved, leading to the full integration of Karabakh back into Azerbaijan.
By the end of 2024, Armenia and Azerbaijan have made alleged progress toward a peace agreement. This included discussions on constitutional amendments in Armenia to address Azerbaijani concerns and the potential establishment of new transportation corridors to enhance regional connectivity. On 18 March 2024, the EU welcomed the successful conclusion of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the full text of the draft Agreement on Peace and Establishment of Interstate Relation (European Parliament 2025).
The Zangezur Corridor:
As connectivity projects reshape Eurasia, the Zangezur Corridor may mark the beginning of the end of Russia’s long-held dominance in the South Caucasus.
Zangezur Corridor: A New Geopolitical Crossroads Diminishing Russian Influence
Strategic Land Bridge in the South Caucasus
The Zangezur Corridor is a proposed transit route connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, by crossing through Armenia’s Syunik Province.
Backed heavily by Azerbaijan and Turkey, the corridor represents a major infrastructural undertaking that could transform the regional transportation landscape by linking East-West trade from Central Asia to Europe.
The 43-kilometer route is part of Azerbaijan’s ambition to become a key transit hub by integrating Nakhchivan more directly with the national economy. On the Azerbaijani side, it will connect with the Horadiz-Agbend rail and highway systems, while on Turkey’s end, it will join the Nakhchivan-Iğdır-Kars transport corridor, strengthening the Anatolia-Caspian axis.
But beyond transport logistics, the project is shifting the regional balance of power, particularly by diluting Russia’s traditional dominance in the South Caucasus.
Azerbaijan and Turkey’s Vision: Strategic Depth and Turkic Connectivity
For Azerbaijan, the corridor promises both economic diversification and national integration. By offering a land alternative to expensive air routes between Baku and Nakhchivan, it facilitates lower transport costs, boosts cargo throughput, and strengthens Azerbaijan’s regional influence.
For Turkey, it’s part of a broader geopolitical strategy. Ankara views the corridor as a physical manifestation of “Turkic unity”, linking the Turkic world from Istanbul to Central Asia. This vision aligns with Turkey’s long-term ambitions to serve as a central Eurasian hub, further sidelining Russian-controlled routes.
Armenia’s Resistance: Sovereignty and Security Concerns
Armenia strongly opposes the corridor in its proposed form. Yerevan sees it as a challenge to its territorial sovereigntyand fears it would grant Azerbaijan extraterritorial control over a critical stretch of Armenian land. Concerns include potential military misuse and economic coercion, especially given Baku’s past conduct during and after the Karabakh conflict.
Although Armenia and Azerbaijan have engaged in peace talks—including transport restoration—the Zangezur issue remains a major sticking point. Armenia is unwilling to grant a customs-free, militarily unmonitored corridor, while Azerbaijan initially pushed for a route free from Armenian oversight. These tensions reflect not just logistical disagreements, but deep strategic mistrust.
Russia: A Waning Regional Power
From Power Broker to Bystander
Historically, Russia acted as the primary security guarantor and diplomatic arbiter in the South Caucasus. However, its position has weakened significantly due to several intersecting developments:
Nagorno-Karabakh’s return to Azerbaijani control removed one of Russia’s key levers in the region—its peacekeeping and mediation role. The Zangezur Corridor, if realised outside Russian oversight, would undercut Moscow’s control over Eurasian transit, particularly its preferred EAEU trade corridors.
The corridor increases Turkish influence, which Moscow sees as a challenge to its authority in former Soviet territories.
Caught Between Iran and Azerbaijan
Russia’s stance is further complicated by its strategic partnership with Iran, which strongly opposes the corridor. Tehran fears it will be cut off from Armenia, a crucial trade partner and its only direct land link to the Caucasus and the EAEU. Iran also views the corridor as a Turkish-Azeri manoeuvre that threatens its regional role and could stoke ethnic Azerbaijani nationalism within its borders.
Open Russian support for the corridor would alienate Iran, but blocking it could cost Moscow influence with Azerbaijan and Turkey. As a result, Russia has adopted an ambivalent position, attempting to remain engaged while preventing the project from eroding its status as the region’s logistical and diplomatic anchor.
Russia’s Diminishing Leverage
Despite Moscow’s attempts to maintain control through diplomatic facilitation and presence in ongoing talks, several indicators reveal a sharp decline in Russian influence:
Peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan are increasingly handled bilaterally, with Russia playing a secondary role.
Security guarantees previously provided by Russian peacekeepers have lost credibility, especially after their perceived inaction during Azerbaijan’s 2023 military actions in Karabakh.
Infrastructure and logistics planning are increasingly driven by Ankara and Baku, often with Western or Chinese economic considerations, rather than by Moscow.
In essence, Russia has been sidelined, not through overt exclusion but through irrelevance in shaping the final format of corridor negotiations and design.
Other Regional Stakeholders
Iran: Geo-strategic Anxiety
Tehran is among the most vociferous opponents of the corridor. It views the project as undermining its position as a transit country, potentially isolating it from Armenian and EAEU markets. Iran is also deeply concerned about rising Turkic nationalism, fearing it may embolden separatist sentiment among Iran’s ethnic Azerbaijani population.
To counterbalance, Iran has:
Deepened diplomatic and military ties with Armenia
Proposed alternative east-west routes that preserve its regional role
Voiced opposition to any project bypassing Iranian territory for Eurasian trade
The European Union: Supportive, But Cautious
The EU sees value in enhanced connectivity between Europe and the South Caucasus, particularly given efforts to diversify away from Russian energy routes. However, Brussels is also mindful of the risks to regional stability, especially for Armenia, and advocates solutions that respect sovereignty and international law.
China: Watching Closely, USA does not want the corridor that offers China a land route into Europe?
China’s interest in the corridor is commercial rather than political. It likely sees the project as a useful extension of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While staying neutral, Beijing is quietly monitoring how the corridor fits into broader East-West transport corridors and its own relationships with Iran, Russia, and Turkey.
It has been reported that the USA does not want China to have land access to Europe. Washington wants China to use only sea lanes. America can cut the sea lanes at any time. Therefore, it is a noose around China's neck. It is clearly a means of pressure against China.
Conclusion: A Corridor Reshaping Power in the South Caucasus
Anna Ayvazyan has published a report on May 23, 2025 (PSCRP-BESA Reports No 133), setting out that:
“In recent years, there have been growing assertions in the academic literature about “the end of the near abroad” for Russia—suggesting that the notion of Russia holding a special status in much of the post-Soviet space has come to an end. In his 2024 article “The End of the Near Abroad”, de Waal argues that Russia’s war in Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped the geopolitical landscape of the post-Soviet region.
The concept of the “near abroad”—which implied Russia’s privileged influence over its neighbors—has significantly eroded. Indeed, in recent years, we have seen several clear signs of this shift. Most often, this refers to the signals that political leaders send outward, indicating their disagreement with Russia’s policies toward their countries.
The decline in relations with Russia is not unique to Armenia. In December 2024, Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243, en route from Baku to Grozny, crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan, resulting in 38 fatalities out of 67 passengers and crew. Initial reports indicated the aircraft was damaged by “external objects” before impact, leading to speculation about the cause (Trend News Agency 2025). Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev criticized Russia for attempting to “hush up” the incident and demanded accountability.
In early February 2025, the Azerbaijani government issued an official notification to Russia, demanding the cessation of activities of the Russian cultural center, known as the “Russian House” (Русский дом), in Baku. Its main activities included promoting Russian culture, science, and education; strengthening the position of the Russian language; supporting compatriots; organising youth projects; facilitating international development; and engaging in historical and memorial activities. By doing so, Azerbaijan demonstrated to Russia that it is not part of the so-called “Russian world” and seeks to be recognised as an independent player.
The current situation is notable because past Western and Russian diplomatic engagement focused largely on Karabakh, preventing direct bilateral dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia’s waning influence has opened the door for other regional actors, particularly Iran and Turkey, each pursuing their own strategic interests. Tehran is especially alarmed by Ankara’s support for the proposed Zangezur Corridor, which would bypass Iran and create a direct link between Turkey and Central Asia via Armenia and Azerbaijan. This project threatens to undermine two key Iranian geopolitical advantages: its exclusive role in facilitating access between Nakhchivan and Baku, and its direct land connection to Armenia.”
The Zangezur Corridor, while still under negotiation, is no longer just a road project—it is a symbol of shifting power dynamics. Where Russia once dictated the terms of regional security and transit, it now watches as Turkey and Azerbaijan drive integration without needing Russian approval or infrastructure. Moscow’s balancing act—between Iran, Azerbaijan, and its own fading influence—has left it strategically constrained and increasingly irrelevant.
References and Sources
https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-zangezur-corridor-a-key-trade-link-in-the-south-caucasus/
https://ednews.net/en/news/politics/657269-the-does-not-want-the
https://besacenter.org/the-impact-of-the-war-in-ukraine-on-the-south-caucasus/